A protectionist foodgrain price policy : The case of rice in Panama

Panama has pursued a protectionist price policy for rice, with domestic prices well above the world market level. The government marketing authority purchases sufficient rice to support the established price level and stores or exports the surplus. Although producers benefit, this policy imposes significant costs on consumers, government expenditures and economic efficiency. One policy recommendation is to bring domestic prices in line with the international level. Although free trade is one possibility, a market stabilization programme could be retained. At a minimum Panama's rice price should reflect domestic demand and not production costs. The unfavourable rice-fertilizer price ratio also deserves attention.     

eBay的品牌管理

eBay的想法是让不同的人进入市场。从而把这个市场变得有效。同时也因为经济的开放。提供一个公平竞争的环境和机会，把不同的人喜欢的不同的东西给连接起来。eBay是历史最长的世界范围的网上交易市场。我们给世界各地所有的人提供一个可以自由贸易的平台。你只要坐在家里，就可以买到你想要的世界上的产品，同时也可以足不出户。卖掉你所要销售的产品。     

Bias from Farmer Self‐Selection in Genetically Modified Crop Productivity Estimates: Evidence from Indian Data

In the continuing debate over the impact of genetically modified (GM) crops on farmers of developing countries, it is important to accurately measure magnitudes such as farm‐level yield gains from GM crop adoption. Yet most farm‐level studies in the literature do not control for farmer self‐selection, a potentially important source of bias in such estimates. We use farm‐level panel data from Indian cotton farmers to investigate the yield effect of GM insect‐resistant cotton. We explicitly take into account the fact that the choice of crop variety is an endogenous variable which might lead to bias from self‐selection. A production function is estimated using a fixed‐effects model to control for selection bias. Our results show that efficient farmers adopt Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton at a higher rate than their less efficient peers. This suggests that cross‐sectional estimates of the yield effect of Bt cotton, which do not control for self‐selection effects, are likely to be biased upwards. However, after controlling for selection bias, we still find that there is a significant positive yield effect from adoption of Bt cotton that more than offsets the additional cost of Bt seed.     

Household Behavior with Imperfect Labor Markets

A household model with differential asset endowments and idiosyncratic transactions costs in accessing labor markets is developed to (1) explain membership of farm households to alternative labor regimes (sellers, employers, or self-sufficient in labor), (2) test for recursivity between production and consumption decisions selectively by labor regime, and (3) identify the determinants of differential labor productivity across labor regimes. The model is applied to a 1994 household survey of the Mexican land reform sector.     

Liberalizing Services Trade In APEC: A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition

The paper studies services-sector trade liberalization in the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum using a global, multicountry, multisector applied general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive service sector. Reducing the service sector's nontariff barriers is modeled by eliminating the possibility for oligopolistic firms to price-discriminate between client countries within APEC and lowering the fixed costs of the firms doing service exporting business. The results suggest that services trade liberalization reinforces existing sectoral trade balances. Increase in demand for intermediate services tends to reinforce rather than counteract the role of primary factors in determining sectoral comparative advantage. The western APEC members received the greatest welfare gains from services trade liberalization, while the developing economies gained more if only tariffs were eliminated.     

What Do Rental Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets?

This article examines the pricing of rental contracts for two types of renter households: those who are able to amass a large, up-front security deposit and those with little, or no, security to offer. Empirical tests are presented to suggest that, in dealing with renter households who have little, or no, security to offer, landlords earn at a similar rate of return as lenders who make riskier loans at a high interest rate to borrowers of dubious credit. The analysis suggests that this situation occurs in large part because of the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard between landlords and renter households regarding the latter's use of the premises.     

Lost in translation: exploring the link between HRM and performance in healthcare

Using data collected in 2004 from 132 Victorian (Australia) public healthcare providers, comprising metropolitan and regional hospital networks, rural hospitals and community health centres, we investigated the perceptions of HRM from the experiences of chief executive officers, HR directors and other senior managers. We found some evidence that managers in healthcare organisations reported different perceptions of strategic HRM and a limited focus on collection and linking of HR performance data with organisational performance management processes. Using multiple moderator regression and multivariate analysis of variance, significant differences were found in perceptions of strategic HRM and HR priorities between chief executive officers, HR directors and other senior managers in the large organisations. This suggested that the strategic human management paradigm is ‘lost in translation’, particularly in large organisations, and consequently opportunities to understand and develop the link between people management practices and improved organisational outcomes may be missed. There is some support for the relationship between strategic HRM and improved organisational outcomes. Implications of these findings are drawn for managerial practice.     

Alliance Strategies of Small Firms

The paper concludes that small firms follow one of two alliance strategies. When the firms are small relative to their rivals and to their market, they tend to use alliances to gain economies of scale and scope; when they are large in relative terms, they avoid alliances. This behavior is consistent with alliance usage by large firms. The paper also analyzes the sources of profit for a small firm that uses a "constellation" of allies to compete in a scale-intensive industry. Its profits depend on a combination of the group-based advantages generated by the constellation, and the share of these profits that the firm can appropriate from the group. Small firms face particular hazards in this regard when their bargaining power within their constellation is weak. The paper illustrates these arguments with data froma small survey, with case studies from the computer industry, and with a simple mathematical model.